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I. INTRODUCTION
The Slaughter-House Cases1 have a bad reputation for good reason.
Justice Miller’s narrow reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
was used to prevent the federal government from adequately protecting
African-Americans after the Civil War.2 Further, his opinion for the
∗ Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. I would like to thank Patrick
Tyler and Alice Johnson for their research assistance, my colleague Taunya Banks, and especially
The University of Akron School of Law, its Constitutional Law Center, Professor Richard Aynes,
and Akron Law Review.
1. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 643-44 (1883); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1875); see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883)
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Court significantly delayed the application of the Bill of Rights to the
states.3 But no one knows whether the world would be better with a
different decision, because counterfactuals are never certain.4 The case
did not involve either racial discrimination or incorporation, and total
condemnation of the opinion for weakening civil rights misses its
context and misreads its design.
This Article sets forth the Slaughter-House Cases’ support for civil
rights. Justice Miller used federalism in order to protect Reconstruction
legislatures where significant numbers of African-Americans
participated fully for the first time.5 His recital of the history and
purpose of the Civil War Amendments centered on the Amendments’
design to protect African-Americans, and suggested sweeping federal
power to accomplish that end.6 Gutting the Privileges and Immunities
Clause compelled the Court to read the Equal Protection Clause broadly,
and was indirectly responsible for the reapportionment decisions of the
Warren Court. The Slaughter-House Court’s structural analysis and its
view of federal protective power provide a basis for congressional power
to protect citizens from any interference with their participation in the
federal political process (voting and discussion of and access to the
(relying on Cruikshank and stating that the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize Congress to
create “a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights”).
3. Even today, the latest case on the application to the states of the Second Amendment’s
right to bear arms holds that it does not, albeit the precedent is more than a century old. See District
of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008) (noting that “[w]ith respect to
Cruikshank’s continuing validity on incorporation, a question not presented by this case, we note
that Cruikshank . . . did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our
later cases. Our later decisions . . . reaffirmed that the Second Amendment applies only to the
Federal Government.”).
4. For example, southern legislatures reconstituted under President Andrew Johnson would
still have countered the federal government, the north might still have tired of the effort to enforce
the laws, segregation could still have developed, the state action doctrine might still have frustrated
congressional action, and Campbell might have succeeded in blocking progressive legislation with
an emphasis on property freedom that could even have invalidated civil rights laws aimed at private
individuals.
5. See MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND
THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 202 (2003) (“When placed within the context of
Louisiana politics, Miller’s majority opinion in Slaughter-House seems hardly a racist attempt to
retreat from Reconstruction. On the contrary, it was a vote of confidence for a biracial
Reconstruction government then struggling to overcome the forces of reaction.”); Jonathan Lurie,
Reflections on Justice Samuel F. Miller and the Slaughter-House Cases: Still a Meaty Subject, 1
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 355, 366-69 (2005); see generally Michael A. Ross, Obstructing
Reconstruction: John Archibald Campbell and the Legal Campaign Against Louisiana’s Republican
Government, 1868-1873, 49 CIV. WAR HIST. 235, 235-53 (2003) (examining the crucial role played
by John Campbell, ex-Confederate and counsel to the butchers in Slaughter-House, in his ultimately
successful legal war to destroy Louisiana’s biracial Reconstruction government).
6. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 49-54.
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federal government).7 Justice Miller’s analysis also supports federal
power to protect citizens from race-based obstruction to their
participation in state elections. The difficulties of proving racial
motivation do not justify blaming Miller’s opinion for the end of
Reconstruction and the rise of segregation.
At the turn of the century, the Supreme Court retreated from the
federal power to deal with race proclaimed by Slaughter-House and its
progeny, but United States v. Guest revived the analysis in 1966.8 More
recently, United States v. Morrison cast doubt on Guest’s statements of
federal power to reach private action.9 This Article argues the Court
should resolve that doubt in favor of the constitutionality of laws to
prevent discriminatory interference with access to state elections or other
facilities. As I will discuss further, Article IV’s guarantee of a
republican form of government reinforces that result and provides an
alternative path for returning to the vision of the Slaughter-House
Cases.10
II. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES
The Fourteenth Amendment11 and the federal government’s
measures to reconstruct governments in the old Confederacy produced
state legislatures with significant numbers of African-Americans, as well
as newcomers from the northern states and southerners who had not

7. See id. at 79-81.
8. 383 U.S. 745, 757-60 (1966) (upholding indictment under federal statute for conspiracy to
obstruct privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States by private attempts to prevent
interstate travel).
9. 529 U.S. 598, 621-23 (2000) (reviving state action of Harris and Civil Rights Cases in
rejecting dicta from Guest).
10. See infra Part VI.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Section 1 is the focus of the Fourteenth Amendment today, but
contemporaries expected other sections to have the most significant impact. They were designed to
strip the old Confederacy of power and to reconstitute it with governments that were not corrupted
by the evils of secession and slavery. Not yet ready to proclaim the right to vote regardless of race
that would be advanced in the Fifteenth Amendment, Section 2 protected against the effect of racial
exclusion in the South by providing for a reduction in representatives in states that denied the vote.
Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment wiped out the old establishment and opened all political
offices to new and untried individuals. It disqualified from holding state or federal office any
person who previously took an oath to support the Constitution and then engaged in rebellion or
aided it. Section 4 repudiated the debts of the Confederacy and prohibited payments for the loss or
emancipation of slaves. Wealthy planters who had supplied the Confederacy were left with
handfuls of worthless paper and lost the power that wealth had brought. See, e.g., DAVID E. KYVIG,
EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 167-69
(1996).
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played any leading role in the War.12 Opponents condemned the
Reconstruction legislatures with epithets both racial and non-racial – for
example, “carpetbaggers”13 and “scalawags.”14 But these legislatures
brought civil rights to the states. For example, Louisiana enacted a
public accommodations law in February 1869 that prohibited the
exclusion of persons of color from places of public conveyances and
accommodation.15 It also enacted further civil rights statutes.16
Along with its civil rights statutes, the Louisiana legislature also
adopted a measure to restrict the slaughtering of meat in New Orleans to
a single location, a slaughterhouse owned by a group of investors known
as the Crescent City Slaughter-House Company.17 The opposition to the
monopoly was high: the butchers, of course, opposed limits on their
practice; the old southern Democrats opposed anything done by the
Republican legislature; and accusations of bribery and monopoly filled
the air.18 A series of suits and countersuits, as well as political and
pragmatic twists and turns, took place before the group of cases known
as the Slaughter-House Cases reached the Supreme Court.19
The butchers hired former Supreme Court Justice John Campbell, a
member of the Dred Scott majority who had resigned from the Court and
served in the Confederate government.20 Campbell sought to use the

12. For example, about thirty-seven percent of the House and twenty-five percent of the
Senate in the Louisiana legislature of 1869-71 were African-American. RONALD M. LABBÉ &
JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 72 (2003). The Lieutenant-Governor, Oscar J. Dunn, was an AfricanAmerican. See, e.g., KWANDO M. KINSHASA, AFRICAN AMERICAN CHRONOLOGY: CHRONOLOGIES
OF THE AMERICAN MOSAIC 55 (2006).
13. “[A] Northerner in the South after the American Civil War usu. seeking private gain under
the reconstruction governments.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 189 (11th ed.
2003).
14. “[A] white Southerner acting in support of the reconstruction governments after the
American Civil War often for private gain.” Id. at 1107.
15. 1869 La. Acts 37. This Act – derisively labeled as the “Social Equality Bill” by its
opponents – “made it a criminal offense to deny African Americans entry to hotels, steamboats,
railroad cars, barrooms, and other public places.” ROSS, supra note 5, at 196.
16. See ROSS, supra note 5, at 196-97 (“In the following month [after the ‘Social Equality
Bill’] the legislature passed a law to enforce the article in the 1868 constitution that required public
schools in Louisiana to be open to all races. This further enraged whites, who labeled the enactment
the ‘School Integration Bill.’”).
17. 1869 La. Acts 170.
18. See LABBÉ & LURIE, supra note 12, at 72-73, 103-06.
19. Id. at 136-66.
20. Ross, supra note 5, at 241, 251.
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new Amendments to foil the laws of the Reconstruction legislature.21
He claimed the monopoly violated the Thirteenth Amendment ban on
involuntary servitude and the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on
state violations of due process, equal protection, and the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.22 Campbell and his cocounsel emphasized the generality of the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment and urged that it apply to all restrictive legislation.23
Justice Miller’s opinion for the majority began with a
straightforward public health analysis of the statute: confining the
operation of slaughterhouses to a single location below the city and
regulating its operation served the public health.24 The limited
monopoly served the interests of the city by encouraging private
enterprise to finance the slaughterhouse and assure enforcement of
restrictions.25 This was within the police power of the state.26
Responding to the butchers’ linguistic argument, Miller said that
the new amendments must be interpreted in light of the purpose of
ending racial discrimination.27 In that perspective, the Thirteenth
Amendment did not apply to a monopoly for a slaughterhouse location.28
The Amendment forbade personal servitude, not limitations on the use
of property.29
Justice Miller distinguished the privileges and immunities of
citizens of a state from those of citizens of the United States.30 The
fundamental rights of “‘protection by the government, with the right to
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain

21. Id. at 249-50. For example, Campbell argued that the Louisiana public accommodations
law denied theater owners their privileges or immunity to run their businesses without intrusion. Id.
at 249 (citing THE NEW ORLEANS DAILY PICAYUNE, May 16, 1869).
22. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-30, Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1872), in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 734, 736-63 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
23. See id. at 22-30, in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 734, 755-63 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper
eds., 1975). Senator Matthew Carpenter represented the Slaughter-House incorporators. David S.
Bogen, The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections from the Admission of
Maryland’s First Black Lawyers, 44 MD. L. REV. 939, 1019 (1985). He also took a broad view of
the substance of privileges and immunities, but argued that the Clause protected against racial
discrimination and did not apply to the health concerns that led to the monopoly. See id. at 1018-20.
24. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 64 (1872).
25. See id. at 65-66.
26. See id. at 60-66.
27. See id. at 67-73.
28. See id. at 67-69.
29. See id. at 69.
30. Id. at 73-74.
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happiness and safety’” were privileges of citizens of a state.31 Thus,
slaughterhouse ownership and freedom to butcher in other places were
matters for state concern, not privileges or immunities within the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment Clause.32 The Clause itself created no
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, but only
referred to those derived from the “[f]ederal government, its [n]ational
character, its [c]onstitution, or its laws.”33
Justice Miller dismissed arguments based on the Due Process
Clause as beyond any previously accepted.34 He also rejected the
butchers’ equal protection claim because it was not comparable to the
race-based denials that gave rise to the Clause.35
III. THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES’ BARRIER TO CIVIL RIGHTS
Justice Miller’s opinion contradicted the Framers’ vision of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause36 and contributed to a judicial retreat
from Reconstruction.37 His historical analysis of the new amendments
supported Reconstruction, but his concern for federalism led him to view
31. Id. at 76 (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)).
32. See id. at 74-79.
33. Id. at 79.
34. See id. at 80-81.
35. See id. at 81.
36. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment overruled Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1856), by making all persons born in the United States citizens of the United States.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 73. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The drafters
believed that citizens were entitled to the same privileges and immunities that are in Article IV, that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment made the Civil Rights Act of
1866 constitutionally unassailable and converted it from a statutory to a constitutional command.
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens that provisions of
Section 1 of the Amendment are all asserted in the organic law already, and Constitutional
Amendment will prevent repeal of the Civil Rights Act); id. at 2511 (Rep. Eliot implicitly equated
the Privileges or Immunities Clause with prohibiting state legislation discriminating against class);
id. at 2539 (Rep. Farnsworth stated that Equal Protection was the only clause in Section 1 not
already in the Constitution). No state could abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States, and, thus, no state could deny them on the basis of race. Id. at 2462 (statement of
Rep. Garfield that the Amendment was to fix the Civil Rights bill in the Constitution); id. at 2465
(Rep. Thayer said “it is but incorporating in the Constitution of the United States the principle of the
civil rights bill which has lately become a law . . . .”); id. at 2467 (opposing the Amendment, Boyer
said “the first section embodies the principles of the civil rights bill . . . .”); id. at 2498 (statement of
Rep. Broomall that Congress voted for Section 1 “in another shape, in the civil rights bill . . . .”); id.
at 2502 and 2513 (statements of Rep. Raymond [Raymond had voted against the Civil Rights Bill as
beyond congressional power and opposed other sections of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment,
but supported Section 1, saying now the bill “comes before us in the form of an amendment to the
Constitution, which proposes to give Congress the power to attain this precise result.”]).
37. See Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L.
REV. 1323, 1336-43 (1952).
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the Privileges and Immunities Clause warily.38 Justice Miller feared the
expansive nationalizing effect of privileges and immunities if the
Fourteenth Amendment Clause referred to the fundamental rights that
Justice Washington identified in Corfield v. Coryell39 as the privileges
and immunities of citizens in Article IV.40 On the other hand, Miller
recognized racial civil rights as the core of the Civil War Amendments.41
The Slaughter-House Cases dissenters identified the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States as fundamental rights, such
as those articulated by Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell.42 The
dissent focused on the negative rights that restrict the power of
government to interfere with the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property:
“Clearly among these must be placed the right to pursue a lawful
employment in a lawful manner, without other restraint than such as
equally affects all persons.”43 Miller surely recognized the dangers to
civil rights in this argument – Campbell had used a very similar analysis
to argue in Louisiana that the state’s public accommodations law
violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause.44
More importantly, Coryell’s fundamental rights included positive
rights, specifically the right to protection by the government.45 Justice
Miller understood that the federal government had the responsibility and
power to secure all the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.46 If they included the protection of life, liberty, and property,
then the security and protection of fundamental civil rights would be
transferred from the states to the federal government.47 The federal
government could remedy state failures to secure and protect such rights,
but it could also protect them regardless of state actions.48 If the federal
government had plenary power to enact such laws, federalism would be

38. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 49-54.
39. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
40. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 75-76.
41. Id. at 49-54.
42. Id. at 96-98 (Field, J., dissenting, joined by Chase, C.J., Bradley & Swayne, JJ.).
43. Id. at 97.
44. Ross, supra note 5, at 249 (citing THE NEW ORLEANS DAILY PICAYUNE, May 16, 1869).
45. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 97 (identifying “protection by the government; the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind . . . .”).
46. See id. at 77-78.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 78 (stating “not only are these rights subject to the control of Congress whenever in
its discretion any of them are supposed to be abridged by State legislation, but that body may also
pass laws in advance, limiting and restricting the exercise of legislative power by the States, in their
most ordinary and usual functions, as in its judgment it may think proper on all such subjects.”).
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at an end.49 Government would change to a national form.50 Insisting
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers did not intend such a result,
Miller said that privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States refer to their rights as federal citizens, that privileges or
immunities relate to the function of the government, and that the scope
of federal power had not been significantly altered except by the other
amendments and other clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.51
After Slaughter-House, courts throughout the legal system used the
limited version of privileges or immunities to deny the Amendment’s
application to state licenses, including bar membership.52 Worse, the
Court consistently cited Slaughter-House in decisions finding that the
federal government lacked power to protect citizens against violence
directed at preventing their voting.53 The decision’s rationale precluded
the use of the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a source for
congressional regulation of contract and property rights. Thus, Congress
had to use other powers to protect individuals from private acts of
discrimination, and even today the Court holds that some attempts by
Congress to protect citizens from violent acts and discrimination are
beyond its power.54
Further, pursuant to Miller’s reasoning, the Clause could not be
used in any argument for fundamental rights not derived from the
functions of the federal government. His insistence that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause did not create any new constitutional rights precluded

49. See id. “[I]t radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal
governments to each other and of both these governments to the people . . . .” Id.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 82 (“[W]e do not see in those amendments any purpose to destroy the main features
of the general system. Under the pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of the war, our
statesmen have still believed that the existence of the States with powers for domestic and local
government, including the regulation of civil rights—the rights of person and of property—was
essential to the perfect working of our complex form of government, though they have thought
proper to impose additional limitations on the States, and to confer additional power on that of the
Nation.”).
52. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872); In re Taylor, 48 Md. 28, 32-34
(1877) (citing Bradwell in concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the
exclusion of blacks from membership in the bar).
53. See James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 138 (1903); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629,
638, 643 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1875).
54. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621-24 (2000) (reviving the state action
doctrine of Harris and Civil Rights Cases in rejecting dicta from Guest); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority).
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the use of that Clause to incorporate the individual rights guarantees.55
Thus, the Court for many years refused to apply the Bill of Rights
against the states, citing the Slaughter-House Cases as support for that
position.56
Nevertheless, in context, Miller’s interpretation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause protected civil rights legislation of reconstructed
legislatures through a strong version of federalism. The misuse of the
case to impair federal power ignored the opinion’s design to shift
protection of the civil rights of African-Americans to other clauses.
IV. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE DETOURS: NEUTRAL ANALYSIS PERMITTING
EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION
Although Justice Miller’s opinion foreclosed use of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause to enforce the fundamental rights of citizens, it left
the door open for the use of other clauses to accomplish many of the
same ends. With respect to several of these clauses, the SlaughterHouse Cases did not support civil rights, but it offered them no barrier.
The Court eventually moved into the openings to accomplish through the
Commerce Clause, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Due Process
Clause much of what might have been accomplished by a broad
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
A. Commerce Clause
The federal government did not regulate expansively during the
nineteenth century. The states’ power to enact laws affecting commerce
posed the main Commerce Clause issue. The Court’s analysis of the
problem distinguished commercial regulation from exercises of the
police power.57 The Slaughter-House Cases noted that regulation of
slaughtering was within the police power of the states, citing Gibbons v.
Ogden for the proposition that health laws were matters subject to state

55. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77. Congressman John Bingham, the chief drafter
of the Fourteenth Amendment, understood that the Privileges and Immunities Clause secured the
fundamental rights of citizens, including the individual rights in the Bill of Rights, against state
abridgement. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84-85 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); Richard L. Aynes, Commentary, Refined Incorporation and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 289 (1999).
56. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 93-97 (1908).
57. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 63; Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 125
U.S. 465, 489-91 (1888).
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legislation.58 Justice Miller referred to “the exclusive authority of State
legislation over this subject,”59 citing several cases to show that health
regulation was a matter for the states and not for Congress.60 Most of
the cited cases upheld state laws against dormant Commerce Clause
challenges and did not focus on the federal power to enact laws
regulating commerce.61
The categorical distinction between police and commerce
regulations reflected in the Slaughter-House Cases was a weak barrier to
congressional power.
As long as Congress regulates interstate
commerce, it preempts state law, even exercises of state police power .62
The key question was how far the federal power to regulate commerce
extended. The Slaughter-House Cases did not discuss that, because no
relevant federal statute applied. Thus, the decision posed no obstacle to
the broad interpretation of the commerce power in the twentieth century,
a power that has become the primary source for the exercise of federal
power, including the exercise of power to promote civil rights.63
B. Thirteenth Amendment
Campbell argued for the butchers that the slaughterhouse monopoly
was an involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment
because it prohibited men and women from using their own property as

58. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 63 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
203 (1824)).
59. Id. (citing City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837)).
60. Id. at 64 (citing United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1870) and License Tax
Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462 (1867)).
61. The only one of these cases to hold federal legislation unconstitutional involved a federal
tax statute that made it a misdemeanor to sell certain illuminating oil. See DeWitt, 76 U.S. at 44.
The Supreme Court unanimously found the statute could not be supported as a revenue measure,
and that it was beyond congressional power because it related exclusively to the internal trade of the
states. Id. at 44-45. The government’s argument focused on the tax justification rather than the
Commerce Clause. Id. at 44. There was no mention in the Slaughter-House Cases of the spending
power, which has become another major source of federal power today. See South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (upholding condition on the grant of federal highway funds that required
recipients to prohibit purchase of alcoholic beverages by persons under the age of twenty-one).
62. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 26 (1824). See Gibbons for the distinction
between commerce and the police power as sources of power.
63. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964)
(upholding the public accommodations provisions with regard to hotels, motels, and similar
establishments under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 305 (1964) (upholding the public accommodations provisions with regard to restaurants under
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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they wished.64 Miller responded that the Thirteenth Amendment
referred to personal servitude and not to limitations on the use of
property, and he gave some examples of invountary servitude.65 His
brief analysis did not touch on congressional power to assure that
slavery would not exist.
Justice Miller’s history of the adoption of the Amendments noted
that the Black Codes were “almost as bad” as slavery,66 and that the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted because the Thirteenth Amendment
had not secured all the Framers supposed they had secured.67 Even if
each law individually did not create slavery, the total had that effect.
Miller wrote his brother-in-law, William Ballinger, that the Black Codes
“do but change the form of slavery.”68 Miller’s comment suggested that
cumulative acts that imposed personal servitude would be fodder for
Congress. Even if statesmen believed “something more was necessary
in the way of constitutional protection,”69 Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment might still grant Congress power to enact statutes like the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.70 Republicans passed the Civil Rights Act and
the Fourteenth Amendment in the same session, arguing just that
position.71 Thus, the Supreme Court acted consistently with the
Slaughter-House opinion when it held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
that Congress could prohibit private persons from racially discriminating
in the sale or lease of property.72

64. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 22, at 7-8, in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 734, 740-41
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) (“I conclude therefore . . . that wherever a law of a
State, or a law of the United States, makes a discrimination between classes of persons, which
deprives the one class of their freedom or their property, or which makes a caste of them, to
subserve the power, pride, avarice, vanity or vengeance of others, that this constitutes a case of
involuntary servitude under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution.”).
65. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 69.
66. Id. at 70.
67. Id. (stating that the Black Codes forced upon statesmen who had guided the nation
through the war “who supposed that by the thirteenth article of amendment they had secured the
result of their labors, the conviction that something more was necessary in the way of constitutional
protection to the unfortunate race who had suffered so much”).
68. ROSS, supra note 5, at 115.
69. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 70.
70. See United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 711-12 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (Bradley,
Circuit Justice).
71. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratexualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 823 (1999).
72. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-44 (1968).
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C. Due Process
Campbell and co-counsel Fellows also argued for the butchers that
the monopoly violated the Due Process Clause, claiming that “it
deprives them of their property without due process of law.”73 They
contended that “[t]he right to labor, the right to one’s self physically and
intellectually, and to the product of one’s own faculties, is past doubt
property, and property of a sacred kind.”74 And they concluded that the
grant of privilege was improper and not due process of law.75
Miller’s response to the due process argument focused on
Campbell’s contention that the right to labor was a property right.76 He
pointed to past interpretations of due process and noted that prior courts
had never found restraints of trade to be deprivations of property subject
to the prohibition of the Clause.77 Because Campbell had not argued that
the butchers were denied liberty without due process, Miller’s rejection
of the property argument did not address whether the restriction was of a
liberty interest or whether government was substantively limited when it
attempted to regulate liberty.78 Similarly, the opinion did not comment
on whether the Due Process Clause could be a vehicle for incorporation
of the Bill of Rights, since no issue arose for application of individual
rights provisions of the Constitution against the states.
Justice Bradley’s dissent in Slaughter-House noted that the Due
Process Clause swept in almost all of the individual rights mentioned in
the Constitution.79 Because Justice Miller made no comment on this,
later courts could pick up the Clause and run with it. And that is what
the Court has done, incorporating almost all of the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause.80 The
delay may not have harmed civil rights significantly, because most of the
important rights were recognized in state declarations and constitutional
provisions, and the Supreme Court did not take an expansive view of
73. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 56 (providing an abstract of oral argument against the
monopoly) (emphasis omitted).
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 80-81.
77. Id.
78. If forced to confront the issue at that time, Miller quite likely would have found against
the butchers.
79. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (stating “. . . above all,
and including almost all the rest, the right of not being deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”).
80. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154, 157-58 (1968) (holding that the right to
jury trial in serious crimes applies to states).
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those rights prior to incorporating them. For example, the Court
incorporated the guarantee of freedom of speech in Gitlow v. New
York,81 but the abstract right of free speech did not restrain the
government until the Court began to overturn convictions in 1937.82
Once the Court accepted the incorporation of freedom of speech
and other substantive individual rights through the Due Process Clause,
it could extend the Clause to unenumerated substantive rights.83 The
noncommittal approach of the Slaughter-House Cases left the due
process door ajar for the Court to walk through.
V. THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES’ SUPPORT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
Justice Miller rooted his opinion in a vision of the Civil War
Amendments as a series of attempts to accomplish the basic purpose of
ending racial oppression:
[T]he one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation
of each, and without which none of them would have been even
suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and
firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newlymade freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.84

He said that purpose must be considered in any interpretation of the
Amendments:
[I]n any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these
amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said
was the pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they were designed
to remedy, and the process of continued addition to the Constitution,
until that purpose was supposed to be accomplished, as far as
constitutional law can accomplish it.85

The Court’s rejection of the involuntary servitude and due process
claims reflected this view,86 but its federalism-focused privileges or

81. 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). See also id. at 672-73 (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting).
82. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242,
263-64 (1937). The first recognition that Holmes’ and Brandeis’ dissents were a proper statement
of the law came in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505-08 (1951).
83. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing the right to privacy);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (recognizing the right to autonomy in intimate choices);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing the limited right to pregnancy termination).
84. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71.
85. Id. at 72.
86. See id. at 80-81.
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immunities discussion87 seemed to conflict. In order to reconcile
federalism with racial equality, the Court relied on the Equal Protection
Clause.88 To reconcile federalism with the need to protect citizens from
racial intimidation, it stressed implied structural rights and federal
protective power over affirmative rights.89
A. Equal Protection
The butchers’ counsel attacked the monopoly as an act of
“legislative partiality” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.90
Miller responded that equal protection was concerned with racial
discrimination, and the monopoly was not a similar oppression:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way
of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It
is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong
case would be necessary for its application to any other.91

Taken alone, the Equal Protection Clause offers no guidance for
application. All classes are distinguishable by reason of the criteria used
to define the class. The only issue is whether that criterion is a
permissible one, and that is a substantive decision.92 Without context, a
court could find that nothing violates the Clause or that anything it
disliked violates the Clause. Miller’s racial focus provided a guideline
to determining appropriate criteria without opening the door to ad hoc
judicial invalidation. Since Slaughter-House, the Court has expanded
the Clause beyond race, but the underlying purpose of the Clause and the
relationship of forbidden categories to the reasons for outlawing racial
discrimination remain relevant.93

87. See id. at 72-80.
88. See id. at 80-81.
89. See id. at 79-80.
90. Id. at 56 (providing an abstract of oral argument against the monopoly).
91. Id. at 81.
92. See, e.g., Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 548-56
(1982).
93. Race is inherent, immutable, politically isolating, stigmatic, and has no inherent
correlation to legitimate government purposes. Gender, alienage, and illegitimacy share many of
these characteristics, and the Court carefully analyzes the situations where the characteristic does
have a proper relationship to the government purpose.
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The butchers’ argument assumed that laws regulating the use of
property were subject to equal protection,94 but that was questionable.
Operating a slaughter-house could be characterized as a privilege rather
than a property right. “Protection” could be limited to securing life,
liberty, or property “against injury or wrong or outrage or violence.”95
However, Miller did not envision any such limitation on the application
of the Equal Protection Clause. If the Privileges or Immunities Clause
did not secure racial equality, the Equal Protection Clause must be the
source for fulfilling the purpose of the Amendment. Thus, Miller
characterized the equal protection of the laws in terms that could apply
to all discriminatory laws.
Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion undergirded the Supreme Court’s
civil rights decision in Strauder v. West Virginia that defendants were
entitled to a jury selected without racial discrimination.96 The Strauder
dissenters (Justices Field and Clifford) argued that all defendants
received equal treatment since they faced the same jury, and various
groups, such as nonresidents, might be excluded from jury
membership.97 The majority, however, insisted that equal protection
applied to jury membership and, at a minimum, should preclude racial
discrimination.98 Quoting Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion, the Court
said, “The existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated
negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship
against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied, and by it [the
Fourteenth Amendment] such laws were forbidden.”99 Equal protection
should not be limited to laws that exclude one race from the protections
of tort, contract, property, and criminal law, but should reach all laws
that discriminate racially:
What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same
for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or

94. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 56 (providing an abstract of oral argument against the
monopoly).
95. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2nd Sess. 496 (1872) (statement of Sen. Thurman). Senator
Alan Thurman argued that the Equal Protection Clause did not apply to the proposed Civil Rights
Act. Id. There are a number of viable narrow interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause –
equality in protecting the fundamental rights secured by a broad interpretation of privileges or
immunities; equality in criminal penalties; equality in protecting individuals from harms caused by
others, etc. See Bogen, supra note 23, at 1020 n.272.
96. 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1879).
97. See id. at 312 (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 349 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting)).
See also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 367.
98. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
99. Id. at 307 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 81).
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white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to
the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily
designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law
because of their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are
prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive
immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race, – the right to
exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as
colored, – exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority
in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights
which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.100

Justice Holmes cited the Slaughter-House Cases’ statement of the
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment when he applied the Fourteenth
Amendment to primary elections in Nixon v. Herndon.101 SlaughterHouse itself had noted that suffrage was essential to fully secure the
person and property of the freed slave, suggesting that equal protection
could not be achieved without the vote.102 Holmes’ decision in Herndon
that racial discrimination in primaries violated equal protection103 led to
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment in voting rights cases.
That progression enabled the Court to examine claims of legislative
malapportionment under equal protection that it had rejected as political
questions when argued as violations of the guarantee of a republican
form of government.104 Thus, by focusing on the touchstone for
interpreting the Clause and intimating a general application, Miller’s
Slaughter-House opinion supported the growth of equal protection that
has occurred in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
B. Privileges or Immunities Implied from the Federal Government’s
National Character
Miller’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
rendered the Clause ineffective, but not the privileges or immunities
themselves. His structural reading encouraged courts to find implied
100. Id. at 307-08. The broad vision of the Equal Protection Clause, traceable to the SlaughterHouse Cases and Strauder, was mentioned by the Court when it struck down residential segregation
ordinances in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 76-77, 82 (1917).
101. 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (“[I]t seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and obvious
infringement of the Fourteenth. That Amendment, while it applies to all, was passed, as we know,
with a special intent to protect the blacks from discrimination against them.” (citing SlaughterHouse, 83 U.S. at 36; Strauder, 100 U.S. at 303)).
102. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71.
103. Herndon, 273 U.S. at 541.
104. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962).
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rights that relate to the function of the federal government.105 Thus,
Miller’s Slaughter-House Cases opinion reinforced his opinion in
Crandall v. Nevada, which discovered a right to travel interstate implicit
in national citizenship.106 The federal government can protect the
exercise of that privilege against private as well as government
obstruction.107 Moreover, the right of access to federal offices
underlying the right to travel supported federal power to protect citizens
of the United States against private interference with their relationship to
the federal government, including voting in federal elections,108 access to
federal facilities,109 and petition and assembly on federal matters.110
1. Right to Travel
The road the Court took encouraged recognition of a right to travel,
including the freedom from discrimination against new residents.111
Today, the best known citation of Slaughter-House Cases to support
civil rights is the use made in Saenz v. Roe:
[I]t has always been common ground that this Clause protects the third
component of the right to travel [the right of the newly arrived citizen
to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the
same State]. Writing for the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases,

105. Miller’s list of privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States included a
variety of international relationships. His quotation from Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35
(1867), implied a freedom to engage in foreign commerce. He pointed to the privilege to request
protection while abroad, which is also an implicit rather than explicit Constitutional right, and he
added the rights secured to citizens by treaties with foreign nations as privileges or immunities. See
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79-80. The implications of his international references have
only started to be worked through, but they provide fodder for thought. See David S. Bogen, Mr.
Justice Miller’s Clause: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States
Internationally, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 1051 (2008). In addition to the right to be free from state
interference with international commerce embodied in the dormant foreign Commerce Clause
concept and the right to claim protection from the federal government, there is a privilege to be free
of state interference in international travel, and a limited privilege to rights secured for individuals
by international common law. Id. at 1055.
106. See Crandall v. State of Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867).
107. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-60 (1966) (upholding an indictment under
federal statute for conspiracy to obstruct privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States by
private attempts to prevent interstate travel).
108. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 660-67 (1884) (endorsing Fifteenth Amendment
exemption and strong Article I, Section 4 jurisprudence for federal protection of voters in
congressional elections).
109. See Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 44.
110. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 512-13 (1939); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
552-53 (1875).
111. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-04 (1999).
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Justice Miller explained that one of the privileges conferred by this
Clause “is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition,
become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence
therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State.”112

Justice Stevens used the Slaughter-House Cases to support a
decision that found a federal law unconstitutional because it
distinguished between newly arrived citizens and established citizens in
the receipt of TANF benefits.113 Stevens also noted the right to travel
interstate.114 Although Stevens did not cite Slaughter-House for this
right,115 Miller’s Slaughter-House Cases opinion, quoting from Crandall
v. Nevada, asserts it:
[A privilege or immunity of citizenship in the United States is] the
right of the citizen of this great country, protected by implied
guarantees of its Constitution, “to come to the seat of government to
assert any claim he may have upon that government, to transact any
business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices,
to engage in administering its functions. He has the right of free
access to its seaports, through which all operations of foreign
commerce are conducted, to the subtreasuries, land offices, and courts
of justice in the several States.”116

The security and protection of national privileges or immunities
rests with the federal government.117 Thus, the federal government can
assure its citizens they can travel to its facilities. In United States v.
Guest, the Court held that private citizens who acted with the intent of
interfering with interstate travel could be indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 241
for conspiracy to injure a citizen in the free exercise of a “‘right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States
. . . .’”118 Although Justice Harlan argued that the constitutional right to
travel was only a right to be free of state interference,119 the majority
found that the right included freedom from private interference, citing

112. Id. at 503 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1872)).
113. Id. at 492-93, 502-03, 509-11.
114. Id. at 500-01.
115. Id. at 501 (“For the purposes of this case, therefore, we need not identify the source of that
particular right in the text of the Constitution.”).
116. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79 (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,
44 (1867)).
117. See id. at 75, 77.
118. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 747 (1966) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964)). See
also id. at 757-59.
119. Id. at 762-63 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Crandall.120 Congress could have enacted a specific statute to punish
such interference using its power to regulate interstate commerce, but
Guest shows that the privilege is applicable against private citizens and
serves as an independent source of congressional power.
In short, Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion recognized that a right
to interstate travel and to reside in other states is a privilege or immunity
of citizens of the United States inferred from the nature of the union, and
that recognition supports federal legislation to protect travelers from
private acts of violence aimed at them.
2. Federal Political and Civil Rights
The Court has used the structural analysis exemplified by
Slaughter-House to find additional privileges or immunities derived
from the nature of the federal government. These decisions are rooted in
an understanding of government by the people: voting in federal
elections,121 access to the federal government,122 and discussion of
federal affairs.123 Congress can protect all of these privileges from
interference, whether the interference comes from government or from
private individuals.
Even before the Slaughter-House Cases decision, Judge Hugh
Lennox Bond of the Fourth Circuit upheld the Enforcement Act of 1870
in the trial of members of the Ku Klux Klan in South Carolina for
interference with voting in federal elections.124 He said that Congress
had power to protect the integrity of federal elections.125 The Supreme
Court agreed with that position in Ex parte Siebold,126 noting
congressional power to regulate time, place, and manner of federal
elections,127 and asserting that this includes power to protect the vote
120. See id. at 757-58 (citing Crandall, 73 U.S. at 48-49). See also id. at 759 n.17.
121. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1884).
122. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867).
123. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 512-13 (1939) (“Although it has been held that the
Fourteenth Amendment created no rights in citizens of the United States, but merely secured
existing rights against state abridgment, it is clear that the right peaceably to assemble and to discuss
these topics, and to communicate respecting them, whether orally or in writing, is a privilege
inherent in citizenship of the United States which the Amendment protects.” (citations omitted)).
124. See United States v. Crosby, 25 F. Cas. 701, 704-05 (C.C.D.S.C. 1871). See generally
Kermit L. Hall, The Courage of His Convictions: Hugh Lennox Bond and the South Carolina Ku
Klux Klan Trials, in NOBLE PURPOSES: NINE CHAMPIONS OF THE RULE OF LAW 49-63 (Norman
Gross ed., 2007). See also United States v. Mitchell, 26 F. Cas. 1283, 1285-86 (C.C.D.S.C. 1871)
(noting Bond’s charge to the jury in the Ku Klux Klan case).
125. See Crosby, 25 F. Cas. at 704.
126. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
127. Id. at 383-84 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4).
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from private injury and from state misfeasance.128 Similarly, writing for
the Court in Ex parte Yarbrough, Justice Miller upheld the convictions
of private individuals for injuring a person in the exercise of his right to
vote in a federal election.129 The defendants argued that states could
provide the necessary laws, but Miller responded that state action was
irrelevant to the federal power to protect federal operations, and that
voting was a critical federal operation: “It is as essential to the successful
working of this government that the great organisms of its executive and
legislative branches should be the free choice of the people, as that the
original form of it should be so.”130 It did not matter that the voter was
not a federal official, since the voter was acting in the exercise of a
federal right:
The power in either case [protecting federal officials or protecting
voters in federal elections] arises out of the circumstance that the
function in which the party is engaged or the right which he is about to
exercise is dependent on the laws of the United States. In both cases it
is the duty of that government to see that he may exercise this right
freely, and to protect him from violence while so doing, or on account
of so doing. This duty does not arise solely from the interest of the
party concerned, but from the necessity of the government itself that its
service shall be free from the adverse influence of force and fraud
practiced on its agents, and that the votes by which its members of
Congress and its President are elected shall be the free votes of the
electors, and the officers thus chosen the free and uncorrupted choice
of those who have the right to take part in that choice.131

Federal law can also protect access to federal offices.132 Miller’s
opinion in Crandall v. Nevada based the citizen’s right to travel on an
assumption that citizens had a right of access to federal offices and
agencies.133 Pursuant to that reasoning, interference with a citizen’s
128. Id. at 396. The Court noted:
Is it possible that Congress could not, in that case, provide for keeping the peace at such
elections, and for arresting and punishing those guilty of breaking it? If it could not, its
power would be but a shadow and a name. But, if Congress can do this, where is the
difference in principle in its making provision for securing the preservation of the peace,
so as to give to every citizen his free right to vote without molestation or injury, when it
assumes only to supervise the regulations made by the State, and not to supersede them
entirely?
Id.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

110 U.S. 651, 660-67 (1884).
Id. at 666.
Id. at 662.
See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867).
Id.
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access to federal offices and agencies interferes with the exercise of a
federal right, even if the individual sought access in his or her home
state.134
Another structural right implied from the nature of government is
the right to assemble and petition the federal government for redress of
grievances. After listing travel and protection abroad as privileges of
citizens of the United States in the Slaughter-House Cases, Miller said
that “[t]he right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are rights of the
citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”135 Less than four years
after Slaughter-House, the Court noted in Cruikshank that the First
Amendment prohibited “Congress from abridging ‘the right of the
people to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.’”136 The Court asserted that the right pre-existed the
Constitution; it was essentially a natural right for the states to protect.137
The Amendment only prevented Congress from abridging it.138 Thus,
the Court, with Miller’s support, repudiated incorporation of the Bill of
Rights through the Privileges or Immunities Clause.139 But the Court
added:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of
petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing else
connected with the powers or the duties of the national government, is
an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection
of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a
government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs
and to petition for a redress of grievances.140

134. See In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535-36 (1895) (recognizing the right to inform officials
of violations of federal law); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 285 (1892) (recognizing the
right of prisoners in custody of federal marshal to be protected from “lawless violence”); United
States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 80-81 (1884) (recognizing the right to access federal land grant).
See also Risa E. Kaufman, Access to the Courts as a Privilege or Immunity of National Citizenship,
40 CONN. L. REV. 1477, 1491 (2008) (arguing that Crandall reasoning leads to a right of access to
the courts).
135. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872).
136. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (citation omitted).
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. See David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 333
(2003), for a discussion on Slaughter-House and the incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the
states.
140. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
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The Court went on to say that if it had been alleged that the “object
of the defendants [had been] to prevent a meeting for such a purpose,
[then] the case would have been within the [Enforcement Act] statute,
and within the . . . sovereignty of the United States.”141 Thus, Congress
may protect people who are petitioning or attempting to transact
business with the federal government, or even meeting among
themselves to discuss federal affairs.
The Cruikshank dicta revealed the dual nature of the SlaughterHouse reference to peaceable assembly. It became central to the holding
of the twentieth century Supreme Court decision in Hague v. C.I.O.142
Labor organizers sued to stop city officials from interfering with their
actions to promote the labor law.143 Citing the Slaughter-House Cases,
the Supreme Court said that “the right peaceably to assemble and to
discuss these topics, and to communicate respecting them, whether
orally or in writing, is a privilege inherent in citizenship of the United
States which the [Fourteenth] Amendment protects.”144 Because there
have been few cases of federal legislation protecting speakers from
private interference, later cases have focused on the limits on
government contained in the Free Speech Clause and its incorporation
through due process.145 However, the implied structural privilege to
discuss federal laws goes beyond the express Clause and enables
Congress to protect citizens engaged in that activity from private
interference.
3. State Political and Civil Rights
Critics of Slaughter-House often focus on its use in subsequent
cases that struck down indictments and convictions for horrendous
assaults, including killing African-Americans who dared to act
politically.146 The murderers escaped punishment for unspeakably

141. Id. at 552-53.
142. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
143. Id. at 500-01.
144. Id. at 512-13 (citations omitted). “Citizenship of the United States would be little better
than a name if it did not carry with it the right to discuss national legislation and the benefits,
advantages, and opportunities to accrue to citizens therefrom. All of the respondents’ proscribed
activities had this single end and aim.” Id. at 513. Justice Stone concurred, preferring to rely on
incorporation through the Due Process Clause, which would apply to all persons. Id. at 524-27.
145. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
146. See, e.g., CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008).
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outrageous acts because the Court either construed the statute147 or the
indictment148 to broadly apply to any voter interference without regard to
racial motivation. The Court held that rights such as voting in state
elections are not privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States, but only privileges of state citizenship.149 The Court reasoned
that, unlike voting in national elections, the state elective office was not
constitutionally based, and the only federal privilege was to be free of
racial discrimination.150 Thus, violent but non-racially based assaults on
state voters were like assaults on anyone else.151 The Court feared the
danger to federalism if the federal government could punish these acts.
Their decisions overlooked paths that would have upheld federalism and
the indictments; but, even as it released the perpetrators, the Court traced
out a theory of federal power to punish the acts that took place.152
The search for federal power to reach perpetrators of violence on
African-Americans begins with Miller’s analysis of the purpose of the
Civil War Amendments. Miller’s reference to clauses of the Civil War
Amendments as new privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States153 signaled an expansion of congressional power to protect
citizens from private interference with the exercise of those rights.
Miller said they called for protecting the new citizen “from the
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion
over him.”154 But the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments created
rights primarily against the state.155 Where the right is only against the

147. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 216-22 (1875) (invalidating convictions by
interpreting sections three and four of the statute to apply to nonracial obstruction and holding that
would not be warranted by the Fifteenth Amendment). Justice Hunt dissented on the grounds that
the Court incorrectly construed the statute, which he interpreted to apply only to racially motivated
interference with suffrage. Id. at 242-45. The Court subsequently questioned the propriety of the
majority’s statutory interpretation. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 24 (1960).
148. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555-57 (1875) (holding the indictment
invalid because it did not allege a racial motivation for the interference with the vote).
149. See Reese, 92 U.S. at 217-18 (holding that the only federal privilege with respect to voting
in state elections was to be free of racial discrimination). See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 556.
150. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 556-57.
151. See id. at 556.
152. The Court could have construed the statute and the indictments to apply only to racially
based actions in these cases. Alternatively, they might have pursued the Guarantee Clause theory
proffered in discussion infra Part VI. See Pamela Brandwein, Rethinking United States v.
Cruikshank: Law and Politics in a Transitional Period (Nov. 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript,
presented at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Society for Legal History) (discussing
Supreme Court’s design to empower Congress to deal with racial violence).
153. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71, 74-80 (1872).
154. Id. at 71.
155. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
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state, only the state can violate the Amendment. Yet, unless the federal
government could deal with private acts of terrorism and the destruction
of the African-Americans’ civil and political rights by violence, new
citizens would not be protected from the oppressions of their former
masters. However, Miller believed that Congress could prohibit racially
motivated political violence.156 Of course, Congress has power to
prohibit interference with constitutional rights, since Congress has
power to enforce those rights. The problem was how private behavior
could constitute interference with a right that existed solely against the
state. Miller’s subsequent decisions show how Congress was authorized
by those Amendments to protect citizens from private as well as
governmental interference.
Circuit Court Judge Bond’s opinion in Crosby offered one
explanation to sustain the application of the Enforcement Act against
private citizens. He argued that Congress was the sole judge of the
appropriateness of legislation to enforce the Amendment and that it
could find that the best way to protect against state discrimination was to
punish all persons who acted to prevent the vote on a racial basis.157
Justice Bradley’s opinion on circuit in Cruikshank gave another
explanation. He distinguished between the fundamental rights that exist
independently of the Constitution and those created by the Constitution
and federal law.158 With respect to natural rights, Bradley said the
Constitution does not create the rights but only limits government
interference with them, and congressional power must be directed to
government action.159 The right to vote, he contended, was different in
nature, because it conferred a positive right that did not exist before.160

156. See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1884).
157. United States v. Crosby, 25 F. Cas. 701, 704 (C.C.D.S.C. 1871) (“[T]he constitution has
declared that the states shall make no distinction on the grounds stated in this first section. And, by
this legislation, congress has endeavored, in a way which congress thought appropriate, to enforce it
. . . . Congress may have found it difficult to devise a method by which to punish a state which, by
law, made such distinction, and may have thought that legislation most likely to secure the end in
view which punished the individual citizen who acted by virtue of a state law or upon his individual
responsibility. If the act be within the scope of the amendment, and in the line of its purpose,
congress is the sole judge of its appropriateness.”).
158. See United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 712, 714 (C.C.D. La. 1874).
159. See id. at 714.
160. Id. at 712 (“Although negative in form, and therefore, at first view, apparently to be
governed by the rule that congress has no duty to perform until the state has violated its provisions,
nevertheless in substance, it confers a positive right which did not exist before. The language is
peculiar. It is composed of two negatives. The right shall not be denied. That is, the right shall be
enjoyed; the right, namely, to be exempt from the disability of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude, as respects the right to vote.”).
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On this basis, Bradley argued that a right created by the Constitution
may be protected by the federal government:
Considering, as before intimated, that the amendment, notwithstanding
its negative form, substantially guaranties the equal right to vote to
citizens of every race and color, I am inclined to the opinion that
congress has the power to secure that right not only as against the
unfriendly operation of state laws, but against outrage, violence, and
combinations on the part of individuals, irrespective of the state laws.
Such was the opinion of congress itself in passing the law at a time
when many of its members were the same who had consulted upon the
original form of the amendment in proposing it to the states. And as
such a construction of the amendment is admissible, and the question
is one at least of grave doubt, it would be assuming a great deal for this
court to decide the law, to the extent indicated, unconstitutional.161

Both Bradley and Bond saw the protection of voting without racial
discrimination as the aim of the Fifteenth Amendment, and found
Congress has power to achieve that end by prohibiting private racebased conspiracies to prevent persons from voting in state elections.
Both explanations had difficulty with the Amendment’s references to
state action, but the Court soon indicated its agreement with their
views.162 The Court said in Reese that the Fifteenth Amendment gave
citizens a new constitutional right to be exempt from racial
discrimination.163 It said in Cruikshank that the Fifteenth Amendment
provides the right to vote where state law discriminates, and that
Congress can therefore protect that right.164 Both opinions spoke of
161. Id. at 713.
162. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555-56 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92
U.S. 214, 218 (1875).
163. Reese, 92 U.S. at 218. (“Previous to this amendment, there was no constitutional guaranty
against this discrimination: now there is. It follows that the amendment has invested the citizens of
the United States with a new constitutional right which is within the protecting power of Congress.
That right is exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude. This, under the express provisions of the second
section of the amendment, Congress may enforce by ‘appropriate legislation.’”).
164. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 555-56 (citing Reese, 92 U.S. 214). The Court said:
[T]he fifteenth amendment has invested the citizens of the United States with a new
constitutional right, which is, exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the
elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. From
this it appears that the right of suffrage is not a necessary attribute of national
citizenship; but that exemption from discrimination in the exercise of that right on
account of race, &c., is. The right to vote in the States comes from the States; but the
right of exemption from the prohibited discrimination comes from the United States.
The first has not been granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States; but the
last has been.
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exemption from discrimination rather than exemption from state acts
that discriminate.
Justice Miller’s subsequent opinion in Ex parte Yarbrough
provided a better basis for reconciling the language of the Amendment
with the power to forbid private racially motivated attacks on voters in
state elections. After holding that the federal government could protect
the right to vote in federal elections because it was a federal privilege, he
argued that the right to vote in a state election without being subject to
discrimination was also a federal privilege.165 The source of the right to
vote where the state excluded African-Americans would be the
provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment.166 Thus, the person exercising
that vote would be exercising a federal constitutional right, and the
federal government can protect the exercise of federal rights:
In all cases where the former slave-holding States had not removed
from their Constitutions the words “white man” as a qualification for
voting, this provision [the Fifteenth Amendment] did, in effect, confer
on him the right to vote, because, being paramount to the State law,
and a part of the State law, it annulled the discriminating word white,
and thus left him in the enjoyment of the same right as white persons.
And such would be the effect of any future constitutional provision of
a State which should give the right of voting exclusively to white
people, whether they be men or women. In such cases this fifteenth
article of amendment does, proprio vigore, substantially confer on the
negro the right to vote, and Congress has the power to protect and
enforce that right.167

This analysis focused on the constitutional obligation of the state to
provide the opportunity to vote without racial discrimination.168 Federal
law may prohibit interference with the state’s performance of that
obligation.169 Even if state law is racially neutral, private violence by
groups like the Ku Klux Klan could exclude a race from the opportunity
to vote provided by the state.170 The result would be ballots handed out
by the state to one race only. The citizen has a right to obtain the vote

Id. (citing Reese, 92 U.S. 214). The Court found the count on interference with the franchise “not
good and sufficient in law” because it failed to allege that any obstruction was on account of color –
but it did not indicate that state action need be alleged. See id. at 555-57.
165. See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663-65 (1884).
166. Id. at 664-65.
167. Id. at 665 (citing Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880)).
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 661-62.
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from the state without racial discrimination, and private acts on a racial
basis could exclude the voter from a benefit that the state was
constitutionally bound to provide. Thus, Congress should have power to
prohibit interference with the right of the citizen to vote without being
subjected to racial discrimination.
This analysis empowers Congress to assist states in fulfilling their
constitutional duties; it does not preempt them. Where the constitutional
duty of the state is negative – for example, “do not interfere with
someone’s natural rights” – private interference with those rights does
not interfere with the state’s constitutional obligation. Where the state
has an obligation to provide individuals with something, private acts
may interfere with the state’s performance of its obligation. However,
even if the duty is the positive one of protecting another individual from
harm, infliction of the harm does not interfere with the state performing
its duty. Thus, the analysis does not threaten federalism because it does
not authorize the federal government to enact criminal and civil laws of
contract, property, and criminal law.
Given the purpose analysis of Slaughter-House, the dicta in the
cases following it correctly found congressional power to ban election
interference based on race. Reese, Cruikshank, and Yarbrough discussed
the right to vote in state elections entirely in terms of the Fifteenth
Amendment, because the Court had not yet found that the Equal
Protection Clause applied to voting.171 Although the state determines
what state offices are elective as well as defining eligibility to vote for
them, equal protection developments that describe voting as a
fundamental interest suggest it may be time to reexamine the scope of
privileges and immunities of United States citizens in state elections.
Today, the Court has recognized a much broader scope for federal
privileges in state elections, noting that equal protection “restrains the
States from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously
discriminate.”172 The Constitution now protects against discrimination
based on gender,173 age,174 or property,175 and the Court has found the

171. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1875); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 555-66 (1875); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663-65 (1884).
172. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
174. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; see Harper, 383 U.S. at 666-67 (holding poll tax
unconstitutional).
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Equal Protection Clause secures equality in representation,176 in the way
votes are counted177 and, combined with the right to travel, protects new
residents as well.178 In making these decisions, the Court has said that
“the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic
society.”179 Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment protects voting against
any invidious discrimination by the state – such a right is a privilege of
citizens of the United States because it is derived from the Constitution.
Under the reasoning used in Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, Reese, and
Yarbrough, Congress should have power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit private interference with voting in
state elections based on invidious discrimination.
James v. Bowman180 stands as an obstacle to this analysis. It was
decided at the turn of the century and, to some degree, put a nail in the
coffin of Reconstruction. In James, the Court stated that a statute that
purports to punish individual action could not be sustained under the
Fifteenth Amendment.181 Thus, Congress could not punish “anyone
who, by means of bribery, prevents another to whom the right of
suffrage is guaranteed by [the Fifteenth Amendment] from exercising
that right.”182 In reaching its decision, the Court relied on Fourteenth
Amendment cases that held state action is necessary – the Civil Rights
Cases and Harris.183 Because the indictment in James did not charge
that the act was done with a racial intent, the holding is slightly
ambiguous; however, the Court’s language on the need for state action
was clear.184

176. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“We hold that, as a basic constitutional
standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state
legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.”).
177. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2000) (per curiam) (requiring specific standards
in recounts to ensure “nonarbitrary treatment of voters”).
178. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338-46 (1972) (invalidating state durational residence
laws as a means of qualifying voters).
179. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62.
180. 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
181. Id. at 139.
182. Id. at 136.
183. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
184. See James, 190 U.S. at 139. The Court stated:
No discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude is
charged. These authorities show that a statute which purports to punish purely
individual action cannot be sustained as an appropriate exercise of the power conferred
by the 15th Amendment upon Congress to prevent action by the state through some one
or more of its official representatives, and that an indictment which charges no
discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude is likewise
destitute of support by such amendment.
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A majority of the Supreme Court rejected this analysis in a
fractured opinion in United States v. Guest.185 Three justices in the
plurality agreed with the three dissenting justices that Congress could
reach private action under its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.186 Justice Brennan wrote a
dissent in which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas joined that
argued Congress could require the state to provide facilities on a
nondiscriminatory basis and could then protect access to such facilities:
Viewed in its proper perspective, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
appears as a positive grant of legislative power, authorizing Congress
to exercise its discretion in fashioning remedies to achieve civil and
political equality for all citizens. No one would deny that Congress
could enact legislation directing state officials to provide Negroes with
equal access to state schools, parks and other facilities owned or
operated by the State. Nor could it be denied that Congress has the
power to punish state officers who, in excess of their authority and in
violation of state law, conspire to threaten, harass and murder Negroes
for attempting to use these facilities. And I can find no principle of
federalism nor word of the Constitution that denies Congress power to
determine that in order adequately to protect the right to equal
utilization of state facilities, it is also appropriate to punish other
individuals—not state officers themselves and not acting in concert
with state officers—who engage in the same brutal conduct for the
same misguided purpose.187

In other words, where the Constitution requires a state to furnish
something on a nondiscriminatory basis, Congress has power to
vindicate that right by punishing anyone who interferes with access to
that good or service. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, like
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, empowers Congress to protect
the states from acts that would interfere with fulfilling their
constitutional obligation.188 This is the reasoning of Yarbrough.189
Justice Clark, joined by Justices Black and Fortas, wrote a
concurring opinion that stated “there now can be no doubt that the
Id.
185. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-60 (1966) (upholding indictment under federal
statute for conspiracy to obstruct privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States by private
attempts to prevent interstate travel).
186. Id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring); Id. at 777-84 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
187. Id. at 784 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
188. See id. at 777; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1884).
189. See Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 662-63.
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specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing
all conspiracies – with or without state action – that interfere with
Fourteenth Amendment rights.”190 Although the Justice did not fully
explain how private action can interfere with a Fourteenth Amendment
right, he believed that preventing access to state facilities on a racial
basis would be such an interference.191
The Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison dismissed this
portion of the Guest decision as dicta.192 However, the Court overlooked
the distinction between affirmative and negative rights. Morrison
stressed that state action was required by United States v. Harris193 and
the Civil Rights Cases,194 the cases that James v. Bowman195 relied
upon.196 But neither case involved interference with a constitutional
right. Although a state may not discriminate in providing any form of
public accommodation, there is no interference with that obligation
when a private company discriminates. Thus, the Civil Rights Cases
concerned negative rights to be free of state behavior rather than a right
to get something.197 Harris involved a lynching where the mob took a
person from state officials.198 The state cannot take a life without due
process, but that constitutional right is a shield against the behavior of
the state.199 The state’s obligation to provide due process is conditioned
upon the state being the source of the deprivation. Thus, a private actor
or group who murders does not interfere with the state’s constitutional
obligation, because the state did not do the killing. Under the theory of
the law in Harris, virtually any criminal act would be a federal crime,
and the Court said that Congress lacked the power to reach simple
breaches of the law.200
The petitioner’s theory in Morrison was that Congress could act
when it considered states acted in a discriminatory fashion in providing
190. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring).
191. See id.
192. 529 U.S. 598, 622-24 (2000).
193. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
194. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
195. 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
196. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 622-24 (citing Harris, 106 U.S. at 639; Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. at 18; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 544 (1875); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313,
318 (1879)).
197. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (“Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured by way of prohibition against State
laws and State proceedings affecting those rights and privileges . . . .”).
198. 106 U.S. 629, 629-632 (1883).
199. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
200. See Harris, 106 U.S. at 643.
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remedies, and the Court at the very least required a greater showing of
necessity on that issue.201 But none of these cases involved an attempt to
protect the state and to enable it to provide mandated goods and services.
Since Morrison did not refer to issues of access to state goods or
services, Rehnquist’s opinion is itself dicta. Congress should have
power to protect the state in fulfilling its constitutional obligations – that
is a method of enforcing the obligation itself.
For example, segregation by school officials violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Congress may prohibit it under its Section 5 powers.202
But Congress should be able to protect state officials from rioters who
attempt to compel them to segregate.203 The federal government must
have power to protect them as it does any other person carrying out a
federal obligation. Violence generally does not interfere with the ability
of the state to protect its citizens equally, because the state satisfies its
obligation by punishing the offender through its civil and criminal laws;
however, where private persons interfere with access to the state so that
the state provides its benefits to only one group (the ones who were able
to show up), the private action creates discrimination. In that context,
the federal government should be able to protect the state from private
interference with its federal obligation.
VI. THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE
The Court might be reluctant to expand federal power under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in light of the precedent of James
and Morrison. However, just as the Court used equal protection to
circumvent prior Guarantee Clause precedents in Baker v. Carr,204 it
could use the Guarantee Clause to avoid the state action limits of its
equal protection precedents.

201. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 624-27 (2000). The Court noted that the remedy
was not congruent and proportional to any alleged violation of the amendment; it was not directed at
the state, and applied even in states that had no history of discrimination. Id. See Pamela
Brandwein, A Judicial Abandonment of Blacks? Rethinking the “State Action” Cases of the Waite
Court, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 343, 355-59 (2007) (arguing that the Waite Court era “preserved
federal power to reach private individuals as a remedy” when there was “state neglect” to protect
race-based wrongs).
202. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 487-88 (1989).
203. See Brewer v. Hoxie Sch. Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91, 100 (8th Cir. 1956) (“[T]he existence
of a Constitutional duty . . . presupposes a correlative right in the person upon whom the duty is
imposed to be free from direct interference with its performance.”).
204. 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962).
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The Guarantee Clause recognizes the importance of governance by
the people of a state as a privilege of citizens of the United States.
Article IV, Section 4 provides that the “United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall
protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic Violence.”205
The Court has treated the Guarantee Clause as raising a political
question inappropriate for judicial review.206 However, the Necessary
and Proper Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States . . . .”207 Thus, Congress has power to enact a law necessary to
guarantee every state a republican form of government. Some
Republicans used the Guarantee Clause to justify Reconstruction
measures after the Civil War.208 In Texas v. White, Chief Justice Waite
said that “the power to carry into effect the clause of guaranty is
primarily a legislative power, and resides in Congress.”209 In general,
however, there has been very little litigation over congressional power
under this Clause.
The Court has indicated that the Guarantee Clause may be satisfied
by a variety of structures.210 If the core meaning of republican
government is control by the people over their rulers, the guarantee may
protect the choices that the state makes from federal interference.211
Professor Merritt has argued powerfully that the Clause “prohibits the
states from adopting nonrepublican forms of government [and] forbids
205. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
206. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (“We hold that the claim pleaded here neither
rests upon nor implicates the Guaranty Clause and that its justiciability is therefore not foreclosed
by our decisions of cases involving that clause.”); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849)
(“[T]he Constitution of the United States, as far as it has provided for an emergency of this kind,
and authorized the general government to interfere in the domestic concerns of a State, has treated
the subject as political in its nature, and placed the power in the hands of that department.”).
207. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
208. See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of
Radical Reconstruction, in MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA 3, 11-12, 17 (2006); WILLIAM M.
WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 166-243 (1972).
209. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 730 (1868).
210. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175 (1874) (“No particular government is
designated as republican, neither is the exact form to be guaranteed, in any manner especially
designated.”).
211. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988).
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the federal government from interfering with state governments in a way
that would destroy their republican character.”212
But the guarantee of a republican form of government should also
empower the federal government to assist the existing state government
in maintaining its republican character. Rather than interfere with state
choices, the federal government could protect those choices. Thus, the
federal government should have the power to assure that persons are
able to vote when they are properly constituted as voters by the state or
by the constitutional prohibition against invidious discrimination. Any
attempt by persons to prevent others from voting for reasons that would
be invidious discrimination should be within the power of Congress to
regulate. These individuals are preventing access to something that the
Constitution requires the state afford without such discrimination. As a
majority of justices suggested in Guest, this should be a basis for the
exercise of congressional enforcement power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.213
A. Voting
According to the reasoning in the Slaughter-House Cases and its
progeny, the federal government can protect individuals from
interference with their exercise of federal rights. If a republican form of
government is guaranteed to the states by the Constitution, the federal
government should have power to protect the states from threats to their
form of government. Several Supreme Court cases have denied federal
power to protect voting in state elections, either on the ground that
voting in state elections is not a federal right, or that the constitutional
limits apply only to state and not individual actions.214 However, none
of these cases squarely addressed the federal power to act under the
Guarantee Clause.215
212. Id. at 25.
213. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 761-62 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring, joined by
Black and Fortas, JJ.); id. at 777 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.).
214. James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 142 (1903) (holding federal statute prohibiting bribery
in elections pursuant to Fifteenth Amendment unconstitutional because no state action required);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555-57 (1875) (holding the indictment invalid because it
did not allege a racial motivation for the interference with the vote); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S.
214, 217-18 (1875) (holding that the only federal privilege with respect to voting in state elections
was to be free of racial discrimination).
215. In Reese, the Court construed a voting rights statute to apply to non-racially motivated
obstructions to state voting. 92 U.S. at 220. It then held that the statute was not justified by the
Fifteenth Amendment, which was confined to prohibition of racial discrimination. See id. at 220-
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The Court did mention the Guarantee Clause in United States v.
Cruikshank, but it did not directly confront the argument that the Clause
supported voting rights legislation. In Cruikshank, the Court dismissed
an indictment that charged defendants with injuring parties because they
had voted in a state election.216 The Court said that the “right of suffrage
is not a necessary attribute of national citizenship,” citing Reese.217
However, the indictment was based on the Enforcement Act of 1870,
which made it a crime to conspire to injure a person “with intent to
prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or
privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the
United States . . . .”218 In order to find a violation of the Enforcement
Act, the Court would have to hold that voting in states was a right or
privilege secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. It did
not do so.219 The Court could not rely on the Guarantee Clause to
establish the right because its precedents held that the Clause was nonjusticiable.220 The Court indicated that the Guarantee Clause was
relevant but did not apply in this case.221
The state made no request for assistance. Although Justice Bradley
on circuit had held the voting intimidation provisions of the Enforcement
Act unconstitutional because they did not require an intent to
discriminate,222 Justice Waite’s Supreme Court opinion did not discuss
them.223 Since the Court did not discuss a statute specifically prohibiting
interference with the vote, it did not examine whether the Guarantee
Clause empowered Congress to enact such a statute. Thus, Cruikshank

22. The government waived all other constitutional arguments, so the case failed to set any
precedent with respect to congressional power under the Guarantee Clause, or even under equal
protection. See id. at 216. Similarly, although it raised the state action barrier, James v. Bowman
did not examine the Guarantee Clause power.
216. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555-57 (1875).
217. Id. at 555 (citing Reese, 92 U.S. 214).
218. Id. at 544 (citing Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 141).
219. Id. at 556.
220. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962).
221. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 556 (“If a State cannot protect itself against domestic violence, the
United States may, upon the call of the executive, when the legislature cannot be convened, lend
their assistance for that purpose. This is a guaranty of the Constitution (art. 4, sect. 4); but it applies
to no case like this.”). See Leslie Friedman Goldstein, The Second Amendment, the SlaughterHouse Cases (1873), and United States v. Cruikshank (1876), 1 ALB. GOV’T. L. REV. 365, 405-07
(2008), for a discussion of the Cruikshank Court’s use of the Guarantee Clause.
222. See United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 715 (C.C.D. La. 1874).
223. He did make reference to Reese, decided at the same term, which held that the Fifteenth
Amendment did not empower Congress to enact the statutes, but did not examine Guarantee Clause
issues. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 555-56. Thus, the opinion in Cruikshank may have assumed the
unconstitutionality of the statutes and, thus, their inability to support the indictment.
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also sets no precedent with respect to congressional Guarantee Clause
power.
B. Other Aspects of a Republican Form of Government
The Guarantee Clause should also extend to empower Congress to
protect individuals in obtaining access to state government, as Guest
suggested.224 Interaction of government with the people is an essential
part of the republican form of government, and the federal government
should be able to guarantee it.
In addition, the federal government should be able to protect speech
on local and state political affairs. As the Court said in Cruikshank,
“The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on
the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.”225 If Congress
has power to guarantee to the states a republican form of government, it
must be able to protect the political speech of its citizens on local
matters.
The implied right to discuss governmental matters based on
representative government is not unique to the United States. Near the
end of the twentieth century, the Australian High Court recognized that
freedom of political speech was indispensible to a representative
democratic government, and found that it was implied in the
constitutional provisions for representative government.226 In the same
way, United States courts should find that the guarantee of republican
government implies freedom of speech in political matters. Such
freedom of speech would not be as broad as the guarantee in the First
Amendment, but it is derived from the function of speech in the
operations of government.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Slaughter-House Cases have been used by opponents of civil
rights because Justice Miller limited the impact of one clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Much of the negative effect of this aspect of
Miller’s opinion has been overcome by using other clauses of the
Amendment in ways that his opinion left open. The opinion itself was

224. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 n.17 (1966).
225. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
226. Austl. Cap. Television Pty. Ltd & New South Wales v. Commonwealth (1992) 104 A.L.R.
389, 393-95.
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designed to protect Reconstruction legislatures in the hope that they
could secure civil rights on a state level. A number of aspects of the
opinion do promote the protection of civil rights. The historical analysis
in the opinion has been used to support broader federal power to deal
with racial discrimination, and its reference to the right to travel has
been cited to support such a federal right. Finally, the opinion’s support
for federal protection of political speech has been overlooked, but the
analysis of privileges of federal citizenship – in conjunction with the
often neglected Guarantee Clause – warrants federal protection of
individual access to state government in voting, facilities, and political
discussion.
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